Napoleon and Grouchy

General Drouot recalled:1

Meantime, the Prussian corps which had joined the left of the English placed itself en potence upon our right flank and began to attack about half-past five in the afternoon. The 6th Corps, which had taken no part in the battle of the 16th, was placed to oppose them, and was supported by a division of the Young Guard and some battalions of the Guard. Towards seven o’clock we perceived in the distance, towards our right, a fire of artillery and musketry. It was not doubted that Marshal Grouchy had followed the movement of the Prussians, and was coming to take part in the victory. Cries of joy were heard along our whole line. The troops, fatigued by eight combats [‘huit combats’, perhaps it should be ‘huit heures de combats’, or ‘eight hours of fighting’] recovered their vigour and made new efforts. The emperor regarded this moment as decisive. He brought forward all his Guard, ordered four battalions to pass near the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, to advance upon the enemy’s position, and to carry with the bayonet whatever should resist them. The cavalry of the Guard, and all the other cavalry that remained at hand, supported this movement. The four battalions, upon arriving on the plateau, were received by the most terrible fire of musketry and canister. The great number of wounded who detached themselves from the columns made it believe that the Guard was routed. Panic spread to the neighbouring corps, which precipitately took flight. The enemy’s cavalry, which perceives this disorder, is let loose into the plain; it is checked for some time by the twelve battalions of the Old Guard who had not yet charged, but even these troops were carried away by this inexplicable movement, and follow the steps of the fugitives, but with more order.

Grouchy’s action at Wavre was vitally important, as it prevented the defeat at Waterloo being far worse than it was.

Robbed of his ‘eyes and ears’ by Napoléon on 17 June, he had no idea where the Prussians were that day un

He was experienced enough to realise the difficulty of breaking contact with the enemy once action had begun, as at Eylau in 1807.

his attacks were not feeble.

For in fact, Napoléon knew from 14.00 that he faced both Wellington and Blücher and that Grouchy was not marching to his aid, regardless of what later French and Anglophone writers have stated.

When Napoléon received the 10.30 dispatch from Grouchy on 18 June, he knew Grouchy could not get to Waterloo. His own order to make the case clearer to the marshal did not arrive with him until 18.00 to 19.00.

Grouchy was the last of Napoléon’s marshals. His reputation since 1815 has been sullied, being blamed for the loss of Waterloo.