Speech and Morality: On the Metaethical Implications of Speaking

Rather often realists have assumed that theirs is the default metaethical position, proceeding as if their primary task is to engage in defensive maneuvers designed to protect their view from objections.

moral realists are frequently accused of accepting a position that is purely defensive in nature.

On the assumption that agents perform speech acts, it follows that moral facts, realistically understood, exist.

an agent can perform a speech act only if and because he has rights, responsibilities, and obligations of certain
kinds vis-à-vis his audience—these rights, responsibilities, and obligations constituting what I call a normative standing.

normative conditions not only attach to the performance of speech acts, but also account (in part) for their performance

normative conditions attach not only to the act of promising, but also to the whole range of speech acts

In my judgment, if there were no moral facts then we would not be able to speak.

necessary condition for the possibility of speech is that there be moral facts of certain kinds.

Speech, I maintain, is a thoroughly normative phenomenon: one performs speech acts such as asserting, promising, and commanding, I claim, by altering one’s normative position with regard to one’s audience, acquiring rights, responsibilities, and obligations of various sorts.