Chilcot Report

All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain
the legal advice for the invasion
intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction formed the subject of the political thriller Official Secrets.


Reviews

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.

(Philippe Sands, London Review of Books)


Chilcot has confirmed that… we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

(Derek B. Miller, The Guardian)


Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher.

(Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books)

Contents
Introduction
Pre-conflict strategy and planning
The UK decision to support US military action
Why Iraq? Why now?
The UK's relationship with the US
Decision-making
Advice on the legal basis for military action
Weapons of mass destruction
Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq
The post-conflict period
Occupation
Transition
Planning for withdrawal
Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?
Key findings
Lessons
Timeline of events

EXTRACT: The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens
162. In their reports to the Security Council on 14 February:

• Dr Blix reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of mass destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist, but Iraq needed to provide the evidence to answer the questions, not belittle them.

• Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported that the IAEA had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear‐related activities in Iraq although a number
of issues were still under investigation.

163. In the subsequent debate, members of the Security Council voiced widely divergent views.

164. Mr Annan concluded that there were real differences on strategy and timing in the Security Council. Iraq’s non‐co‐operation was insufficient to bring members to agree that war was justified; they would only move if they came to their own judgement that inspections were pointless.

165. On 19 February, Mr Blair sent President Bush a six‐page Note. He proposed focusing on the absence of full co‐operation and a “simple” resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity, with a side statement defining tough tests of co‐operation and a vote on 14 March to provide a deadline for action.

166. President Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the UN the following week but its terms were subject to further discussion.

167. On 20 February, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he wanted to offer the US an alternative strategy which included a deadline and tests for compliance. He did not think Saddam Hussein would co‐operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as possible. Iraq could have signalled a change of heart in the December declaration. The Americans did not think that Saddam was going to co‐operate: “Nor did he. But we needed to keep the international community together.”

168. Dr Blix stated that full co‐operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline of 15 April would be too early. Dr Blix commented that “perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all”. Mr Blair responded that “even German and French intelligence were sure that there was WMD in Iraq”. Dr Blix said they seemed “unsure” about “mobile BW production facilities”: “It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and find very little.”

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