The Critique of Pure Reason

o far as the object is given to us. T

because in no other way can an object be given to us.

nd finds that this harmony never results except through the above distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just.]

But, after we h

world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgement* of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks—that of

The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought

By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought.

hat there are two sources of human knowledge

Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.

our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition

We find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain à priori the perception even of those laws which the most common experience confirms.